In the 2003 and 2004 proxy seasons the Securities Exchange Commission allowed shareholders' proposals to expense employee stock options to be voted upon at the annual meeting. We analyze the determinants of shareholders' votes for a sample of 107 firms. We hypothesize and find that votes for expensing are higher in firms with perceived excessive option compensation and lower expected earnings impact from expensing. Voting support is also related to ownership. In particular, insiders' ownership is positively associated to votes against, but is associated with votes for from non-insider shareholders. Institutional investor ownership is associated with votes for expensing, except in cases where institutional investors have potential conflicts of interest with management. Finally, votes for are higher in firms with higher interest coverage, higher leverage, higher governance concerns, and lower returns. JEL Classification: G34, J33, M41, M52.
"Every time there is another majority vote, it is a step in the direction of mandating expensing" (Institutional Shareholder Services, Business Week, May 27, 2003) "The Board's conclusion that many users of financial statements support recognition of the cost of employee services received in exchange for share options…was confirmed in a number of ways, including […] numerous nonbinding shareholder resolutions in which both institutional and individual investors urged entities to adopt Statement 123's fair-value-based method for recognition purposes" (Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.123R, December 2004) 
Introduction
In December 2002, the Securities Exchange Commission (S.E.C.) decided to allow shareholder proposals requesting the expensing of employee stock options (ESO) to be voted upon at annual meetings. This was the first time that the S.E.C. allowed shareholders to vote on an accounting matter.
1 This decision came in the wake of the collapse of the technology sector and the emergence of a number of high profile accounting scandals. As these events unfolded, the accounting treatment for ESO, which allowed firms not to expense the cost of Employee Stock Options in their income statements and instead disclose it in the financial statements'
footnotes, 2 became the target of strong criticism. In particular, investors, capital market intermediaries, and legislators argued that lack of ESO expensing had led to excessive optionbased compensation (e.g. Bodie et al. 2003) . In turn, they claimed, excessive ESO created perverse incentives to (a) time opportunistically option grant dates, and (b) inflate reported earnings, ultimately resulting in accounting frauds and restatements. In this environment, the 1 In general, under Rule 14a-8(i)(7) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, shareholder proposals dealing "with a matter relating to the company's ordinary business operations" -such as the choice of accounting methods -can be excluded from the proxy statements. Based on this rule, the S.E.C. initially let firms exclude ESO expensing proposals, but then in December 2002 reversed its position, on the ground that the accounting treatment of ESO had become a "social policy" issue and, as such, was not subject to the ordinary business rule. 2 In 1993, a Financial Accounting Standards Board's (FASB) exposure draft proposing the expensing of ESO based on their fair values at grant date had met strong political opposition and resulted in the issuance in 1995 of the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.123 (SFAS 123) , which essentially allowed firms to choose between recognition and disclosure of the ESO expense.
Financial Accounting Standards Board reconsidered the accounting treatment for ESO, and eventually issued rule SFAS No. 123R mandating all companies to expense ESO (see Appendix 1 for a description of the events that led to this mandate).
In this study we provide evidence on shareholders' views on ESO expensing by examining the voting outcome of these proposals at a sample of 107 firms. In particular, we hypothesize and find that votes in favor of ESO expensing are positively related to the magnitude of perceived excessive CEO option compensation, suggesting (at least some) shareholders expect that expensing ESO will discipline the use of option-based compensation. But votes in favor of ESO expensing are negatively related to the expected earnings impact of expensing ESO, consistent with (some) shareholders fearing that expensing ESO will have a negative impact on the stock price. We also distinguish the reaction from different shareholder types and find that:
(i) insiders vote against ESO expensing, but insider ownership is positively related to votes cast in favor of ESO expensing by non-insider shareholders, possibly due to the perception that higher insider ownership exacerbates the problems associated with excessive option compensation;
(ii) on average, institutional investors support ESO expensing, regardless their investment horizon (i.e. "long-term value" oriented versus "short-term earnings" oriented); however, once we partition them based on their potential for conflicts of interest (i.e. business dealings with their portfolio firms), we find consistent support for ESO expensing only from institutional investors less likely to have conflicts of interest.
Support for ESO expensing is also related to a number of control variables: it tends to be higher in firms with lower stock returns, firms with higher leverage and interest coverage ratios, and firms with higher percentage of votes withheld from director re-elections, consistent with past performance, contracting costs, and governance concerns playing a significant role in shareholders' voting decisions. The above results are robust to the Heckman two-step correction, were we control for selectivity bias. We find that firms targeted by shareholder activists are large, mostly from the S&P 500 index, but cover a broad range of industries. Relative to other S&P 500 firms, targeted firms are still significantly larger and tend to have somewhat higher levels of dilution and CEO option holdings.
Our work contributes to the literature on ESO expensing. While previous studies explore arguments in support of, or against, ESO expensing from the perspective of management by analyzing the firms' decision to voluntarily expense ESO and the consequent market reaction (e.g. Aboody et al., 2004a )-focusing mostly on issues of signaling and transparency-our study provides a unique opportunity to explore those arguments from the perspective of shareholders in a context where managers oppose ESO expensing.
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Our study also provides first evidence of a mechanism-shareholder voting-that shareholders could apply to affect accounting choices at the firm level and perhaps to affect regulators' decisions at a broader level. 4 In this setting, shareholder votes may have used the voting process to gather and formalize other investors' support, generate media attention, pressure targeted firms and influence the standard-setting process (Watts and Zimmerman 1990) .
Our study documents the wide support of these votes and the reasons that led shareholders to support the expensing of ESO in the firm's income statements. 3 In this respect, our study is closer in spirit to Espahbodi et al. (2002) , who analyze cross-sectional stock price reactions to FASB deliberations on ESO expensing in the early 1990s, the key difference being that we infer shareholders' preferences from their voting decision rather than from stock price changes. Arguably, shareholders' trading decisions (as reflected in stock price changes) provide a stronger indication of shareholders' preferences relative to the votes cast at the annual meeting. However, shareholders' voting decisions are likely to be a more direct and less noisy measure of their preferences. Besides, while stock price changes (or the lack thereof) reflect the view of the 'marginal' shareholder, the voting outcome reflects the views of all shareholders, thereby giving us the opportunity to explore the preferences of different types of shareholders.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop our hypotheses on the determinants of votes in favor and against ESO expensing. Section 3 describes the sample and the voting outcome, and analyzes the characteristics of the targeted firms. After outlining our methodology and defining the variables used in the tests (Section 4), in Section 5 we present the results of the analysis of the determinants of the voting outcome. Section 6 concludes.
Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
The increase in the level of CEO compensation during the 1990s, mostly fueled by large grants of ESO, has attracted strong criticism from investors, concerned with a possible disconnect between CEO pay and firms' performance 5 , increasing dilution levels (also due to the widespread use of ESO at the non-executive level), and distorted incentives potentially provided by excessive option grants. Indeed, a number of studies document a positive association between option compensation and earnings management (Bergstresser and Philippon 2005) , accounting restatements (Burns and Kedia 2006; Efendi et al. 2007) , and shareholder litigation (Peng and Roell 2004) . Research has also documented opportunistic behavior in the timing of CEO option grants and repricings (Yermack 1997; Ferri 2005; Heron and Lie 2007) , as well as in terms of disclosures and/or earnings management around option grants and option exercises (Aboody and Kasznik 2000; Balsam et al. 2003; Bartov and Mohanram 2004) .
There is a general belief among the public that the explosive growth in the use of ESO was partly the result of lack of mandatory ESO expensing because "when something is significantly under-priced, it is often also substantially over-consumed" (Standard & Poor 2002) . A corollary of this argument is that expensing ESO would lead to a reduction in their use. 6 In particular, voting shareholders may have expected that voting in favor of ESO expensing would result in lower use of options in CEO compensation for three main reasons. First, managers and Boards may have been concerned with the higher visibility and scrutiny of CEO compensation triggered by a recognition regime (Guay et al. 2003) . 7 Second, a positive voting outcome (whether or not resulting in ESO expensing) and the resulting media coverage may have also resulted in higher visibility of CEO compensation and put pressure on Compensation Committees to restructure the compensation packages (Thomas and Martin, 1999 Some voting shareholders, however, may have feared that ESO expensing would cause a drop in stock price proportional to the magnitude of the expense, for two reasons.
First, ESO expensing could reveal to the market the extent of the option compensation costthe underlying assumption being that investors would not have been able to fully recognize this 5 The extent to which CEO pay actually reflects performance is currently a subject of intense debate in the academic community. See Bebchuk and Fried (2004) and Core et al. (2004) for two opposing views and thorough discussions of the empirical evidence to date. 6 Brown and Lee (2007) document a significant reduction in the use of ESO in total compensation for top 5 executives as a result of mandatory ESO expensing (FAS123R) and show that such reduction resulted in a decrease in total compensation in firms with abnormally high executive compensation before FAS 123R. 7 Previous studies suggest that firms whose executives receive higher compensation are more likely to: (i) lobby against more explicit forms of disclosure of their compensation (Dechow et al. 1996; Hill et al. 2002) , (ii) disavow (Blacconiere et al. 2004 ) and manage downward the option expense disclosed (Aboody et al. 2006) or recognized (Johnston 2006) under SFAS 123, and (iii) have poorer voluntary disclosure of compensation practices in the proxy statements (Laksmana 2005). amount from the financial footnotes, either because they were fixated on the earnings number or because information disclosed in footnotes was less reliable/visible (Bodie et al. 2003; Libby et al. 2005 ) and more costly to process (Barth et al. 2003) than information recognized in the income statement. While a number of papers documented that the SFAS 123 footnote (pro forma) disclosures were value relevant (Aboody 1996a; Aboody et al. 2004b ), these findings do not imply that ESOs were fully and correctly priced before the SFAS 123R rule was approved, Indeed, Espahbodi et al. (2002) analyzed returns around FASB announcements during its deliberations of SFAS 123 and concluded that the disclosure of ESO expense was not a substitute for its recognition. It follows that, to the extent that investors placed more weight on recognized versus disclosed amounts (e.g. Aboody 1996b), recognizing the ESO expense could have triggered a price decline proportional to its magnitude.
A second argument is that ESO expensing could create real economic costs to the firm if it affected the terms of the firm's contracts or required their renegotiation (Watts and Zimmerman 1990; Guay et al. 2003) .
Under either argument ESO expensing may have led investors to expect a negative price reaction proportional to the magnitude of the expense, resulting in the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Ceteris paribus, the fraction of votes in favor of ESO expensing is lower in firms characterized by greater expected earnings impact from expensing options.
Our next hypotheses refer to the impact of ownership composition on the voting outcome.
Historically, institutions have mostly voted in concert with management, but recent evidence documents a positive association between institutional ownership and votes in support of governance-related shareholder proposals (Bethel and Gillan 2003) . With respect to ESO expensing, while numerous surveys indicated that the vast majority of institutional investors were in favor (CalPERS 2002; McKinsey & Co. 2002) , theoretical arguments lead to different predictions for different types of institutional investors, depending on their investment horizons and strategies (Bushee 1998) , as well as potential conflicts of interest (Black 1990; Almazan et al. 2005) . As a result, we make no prediction on the sign of the overall relation between institutional ownership and voting outcome.
However, we hypothesize that institutional investors more concerned with short-term reported earnings-and thus, with the negative earnings impact from expensing ESO 8 -would have been more likely to vote against the proposal, while institutions more concerned with longterm value-and, thus, with the benefits from a reduction in excessive option usage-would have bee n more likely to vote in favor:
Hypothesis 3a (H3a): Ceteris paribus, the fraction of votes in favor of ESO expensing is higher (lower) in firms characterized by higher fraction of votes controlled by 'long-term value'
('short-term earnings') oriented institutional investors.
Also, we hypothesize that institutions more likely to have business dealings with the firm, such as banks or insurance companies, would have been more likely to vote with management (e.g. Brickley et al. 1988 ) and, thus, against the proposal, while institutions with lower or no conflicts of interests, such as public pension funds, would have been more likely to vote in favor of ESO expensing in an attempt to discipline the use of option-based compensation (Almazan et al. 2005 ):
8 Bushee (2001) finds that institutions with short investment horizons myopically price firms, overweighting shortterm earnings potential and underweighting long-term earnings potential. Other studies document that firms with high level of transient ownership are more likely to meet or beat expectations on a consistent basis (Matsumoto 2002) and to reduce their CEOs compensation in case of negative earnings surprises (Shin 2005 
Sample Selection and Description of the Voting Outcome
In this section we provide a description of our data (Section 3.1) and the voting outcome of the ESO proposal (Section 3.2). We also explore the incentives of the proponents and provide an analysis of the characteristics of the targeted firms (Section 3.3). 
Sample and Data Sources

Significance of the Voting Outcome
Under the current legal regime, shareholder proposals are typically non-binding, raising the question of the significance of the shareholders' vote. Several characteristics of the ESO proposal suggest the vote on this issue was well informed and was significant both to the managers and to the shareholders of the targeted firms.
Evidence suggests managers reacted to the proposal both before and after the vote. We found that about 25% of the firms targeted in 2003 agreed to expense before the annual meeting (thus, avoiding the vote before it occurred). Some of the other firms tried to exclude the proposal from the proxy, or engaged in costly campaigns to promote a vote against the proposal. 9 These efforts suggest that managers were concerned with the consequences of an undesired voting outcome.
Managers also reacted to the proposal after the vote. Ferri and Sandino (2007) show that the degree of voting support for the ESO proposal was associated with (i) a higher likelihood of subsequently adopting ESO expensing, (ii) a decrease in the level of CEO compensation, and (iii) a decrease in the use of ESO in CEO compensation.
The vote was also significant to the shareholders. Shareholders had several reasons to believe they could and/or should influence the voting outcome. First, the pro-expensing position of some of the institutional investors and their influential representatives (e.g. TIAA-CREF, Council for Institutional Investors, Institutional Shareholder Services) was well known before the proxy season, Second, the voting outcome of the first proposals confirmed that there was a real chance to obtain a majority vote, creating a domino effect on subsequent proposals. Finally, there was significant potential for positive spillover effects, for two reasons: (i) the high press coverage put pressure on and elicit a reaction from management and Boards even in non-targeted firms (Ferri and Sandino 2007) ; (ii) a majority vote could have affected FASB decision to mandate the expensing of ESO for all publicly traded firms and thus (all else being equal) increase exponentially any expected benefit (e.g. more disciplined use of options).
The high voting turnout (72.5% on average) and the high degree of support for the proposal, confirmed the engagement of shareholders in the voting process. As shown in the bottom line of This favorable voting outcome was highly publicized by the press and evoked by shareholders in their lobbying efforts to persuade the FASB to mandate ESO expensing, as exemplified in the epigraph.
[ . For a general discussion of the dual role of unions as shareholders and employees' representatives, see Schwab and Thomas (1998 studies (Karpoff et al. 1996; Johnson and Shackell 1997; Bizjak and Marquette 1998) , namely executives' ownership (EXECOWN), institutional ownership (INSTOWN), total assets (LNSIZE), market-to-book ratio (MB_RATIO), three-year stock returns (RETURNS), debt ratio (LEVERAGE), the percentage of executives sitting on the Board (EXECONBOARD) and a dummy for high-tech firms (HITECH).
Shareholder Proponents and Characteristics of Targeted Firms
The 153 firms targeted were indeed distributed across multiple industries, though the industry composition differs from that of all Compustat firms (see chi-square test in Table 2 , Panel A), due to an over-representation of firms in the utility sector. Table 2 , Panel B (left section) compares the targeted firms to the population in terms of the variables described above.
While there are many significant differences, the most striking one is that targeted firms are about five times larger in total assets ($27.1bn versus $5.3bn). Given the proponents' focus on large, highly visible firms and since 95% of the targeted firms either are in the S&P 500 or are larger in size than the smallest firm in the S&P 500, in the right section of Panel B, we also compare targeted firms to other firms in the S&P 500 index (excluding those already expensing ESO). Univariate tests suggest that firms targeted by the ESO expensing proposals are still significantly larger, tend to have somewhat lower levels of institutional ownership and options expense (though these differences do not appear economically relevant), but do not differ significantly in terms of growth opportunities, leverage, dilution and governance characteristics.
Noticeably, they have a higher percentage of unionized employees, but the difference is not statistically significant. Similar results hold for the sub-sample of 107 targeted firms where the proposal was ultimately voted upon.
[ In a multivariate setting, the probit regression in Table 2 , Panel C (col. 1 and 2), shows that, relative to the other firms in the S&P 500, targeted firms tend to be larger, high-tech firms, with higher dilution or CEO option holdings, lower option expense (only in column 1), higher executives' ownership and lower fraction of executives sitting on the Board 17 . Again, the fraction of unionized employees does not appear to be a significant selection criterion. The same analysis
for the sub-sample of targeted firms where the proposal was eventually voted upon (columns 3 and 4) yields similar findings, except that size is no longer significant-suggesting that the firms that avoided the vote by agreeing to expense ESO (see Table 1 , Panel A) are the largest among the targeted firms. The results in Table 2 , Panel C, are substantially unchanged when we re-run the probit regressions clustering by firm to account for cases with proposals in both 2003 and 2004, except that OPTEXPENSE is always statistically significant with a p-value below 0.05..
Research Design and Variable Definitions
To test our hypotheses we use the following OLS regression:
% Votes FOR ESO Expensing = f (Excessive Option Compensation, Expected Earnings Impact from ESO Expensing, % Votes controlled by Institutions, % Votes controlled by
Insiders, Control Variables)
To account for selection bias, we also employ a two-step Heckman model where the first step (probability of the ESO expensing proposal being voted upon) is the probit model described in Sec.3.3 (see Table 2 , Panel C, col.3 18 ) and the second step is the OLS regression in (1), with the 0.51 between DILUTION and OPTEXPENSE. 17 More independent Boards may be targeted because more likely to adopt the proposal either before the vote or after a majority-vote (Ertimur et al. 2005) . Also, outside Board members are likely to sit on Boards in other firms, creating the opportunity for spillover effects. 18 The results in the rest of the paper are unchanged when the inverse Mill's ratio is obtained instead from the probit regression in 
Main Independent Variables
Below we describe the variables used to test our hypotheses. Appendix 3 provides more details on their computation and the data sources used.
a) Excessive CEO Option Compensation
Excessive CEO Option Compensation [EXCESSOPTCEO]: critics of ESO generally point to the "mega-grants" of options to top management-in particular the CEO-and to the resulting high levels of dilution (Thomas and Martin 2000) . Accordingly, our proxy for excessive option compensation (EXCESSOPTCEO) focuses on CEO's option holdings and is computed as the difference in the ratio (Number of Options held by CEO/Total Shares Outstanding) between each sample firm and an 'industry-size' median, scaled by the 'industry-size' median. The 'industrysize' median is the median value of the above ratio for a control group of firms of similar size, in the same industry (see Appendix 3 for details). Thus, we assume that shareholders, following the practice of most compensation consultants (Bizjak et al. 2000) , will assess their firm's option granting practices relative to a set of peer companies. 19 All the results presented in this study are unchanged when we use VOTESFOR instead of VOTES, as well as when VOTESFOR is redefined as percentage of all votes cast, including abstention votes.
b) Expected Earnings Impact from ESO Expensing
We examine two measures of the earnings impact from recognizing the ESO expense:
-Magnitude of Option Expense [OPTEXPENSE]: a natural proxy for shareholders' concern about negative consequences from ESO expensing is the magnitude of the disclosed option expense, scaled by the market value of equity.
-Profit Loss Threshold [PROFTHRESH] : voting shareholders may be concerned with the effect of expensing on certain earnings benchmarks. In particular, they may fear that a change from profit to loss will affect price. Previous literature has documented negative liquidity effects associated with reporting losses (Hwang et al. 1996; Ertimur 2003) . Hence, we construct a profit/loss threshold dummy equal to 1 if recognizing the ESO expense would have turned a profit into a loss, and 0 otherwise.
c) Ownership Composition
To understand the voting behavior of institutional investors we first look at an aggregate Institutional Investors: Bushee (1998) classifies institutions based on their past investment behavior, measured in terms of portfolio turnover, diversification and trading sensitivity to current earnings news. "Transient" institutions have the highest turnover and follow momentum investment strategies, "Dedicated" institutions are characterized by having large investments in firms, low portfolio turnover, and no trading sensitivity to current earnings news, while "Quasi-indexers" are characterized by high diversification and low portfolio turnover-a characteristic of buy-and-hold value strategies. We group "Dedicated" and "Quasi-indexers" institutions into LONGTERM institutions and predict higher votes FOR from these institutions and higher votes AGAINST by TRANSIENT institutions. 
Control Variables
We examine three sets of control variables, capturing, respectively, the financial characteristics of the firms, certain corporate governance features, and industry effects.
a) Controls related to Financial Characteristics
-Size [SIZE]: Although shareholder proposals typically receive lower support in larger firms, 20 several arguments lead us to predict the opposite relation in our setting. Larger firms have a stronger motivation to commit to transparent reporting due to their higher visibility (Watts and Zimmerman 1990; Aboody et al. 2004a ) and should be less concerned about a negative price effect from expensing ESO because of higher coverage by capital market intermediaries (i.e. price is more likely to already impound information in financial footnotes reported under SFAS 123). Smaller firms, on the other hand, may be more concerned about an excessive 20 Gordon and Pound (1993) and Bethel and Gillan (2003) note that in larger firms executives have greater political power and are able to spend more resources lobbying against shareholder proposals (e.g. investing in public relations and proxy solicitors). Bizjak and Marquette (1998) and disclose, all their equity compensation plans (SEC 2002 (SEC , 2003 . We calculate the fraction of outstanding options which was granted under equity compensation plans not submitted to shareholders for approval. Prior studies suggest that this measure is a symptom of poor governance (Weber et al. 2003) . Thus, we expect a positive relation with votes FOR. [ 
c) Controls related to Industry Effects
Empirical Analysis and Results
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
where EARNINGSIMPACT is alternatively defined as OPTEXPENSE or PROFTHRESH.
The results in Table 4 To better interpret the result on the compensation variable, in untabulated tests we introduce another measure of excessive option usage based on all options outstanding other than those held by the CEO (EXCESSOPTNONCEO). Taken together, EXCESSOPTCEO and EXCESSOPTNONCEO measure the amount of excessive dilution (i.e. excessive relative to firms of similar size in the same industry). Interestingly, we find that EXCESSOPTNONCEO is not related to the voting outcome. We interpret this finding as an indication that shareholders are not concerned with the cost of granting too many options per se, but with the (more substantial) costs potentially stemming from the distorted incentives that excessive option packages may induce in those with significant decision-making authority-the CEO in primis.
To investigate differences across institutional investors (H3a and H3b), we split them first into LONGTERM and TRANSIENT (columns 3 and 4), and then into ACTIVE and PASSIVE (columns 5 and 6). As predicted (H3a), there is a positive and significant association between LONGTERM institutions and votes in favor of expensing, but we do not find that TRANSIENT institutions oppose expensing. On the contrary, the coefficient is positive and significant.
Stronger support is found for H3b, in that only ACTIVE institutions are positively and significantly associated with votes in favor of ESO expensing, 24 while the coefficient on PASSIVE is insignificant (though positive).
[ This assumption is supported by the high correlation between INSIDEOWN and VOTESFOR (Table 3 , Panel B) and allows us to focus on the determinants of the votes really "in play".
Results are presented in columns 7 and 8. The coefficient on INSIDEOWN is now positive and significant, consistent with our conjecture (H4b) that non-insiders are more concerned with excessive option compensation and, thus, more likely to vote for ESO expensing, when insiders' ownership is higher. In spite of the significant drop in R-square, the other results are unchanged, 24 Note that the ACTIVE category includes groups -such as mutual funds -who may indeed be subject to significant conflicts of interest when casting their votes. This problem has prompted the S.E.C. to require mutual funds to disclose their proxy votes (starting with the proxy season 2004). Davis and Kim (2005) analyze the voting records of 23 fund families in the 2004 proxy season over a number of shareholder proposals, including ESO expensing. Overall, they do not find evidence that mutual funds vote with management at their clients, but they find a positive relation between propensity to vote with management and volume of pension business, both in general and for the ESO expensing proposal in particular. They also document that CalPERS abstained from voting on ESO expensing proposals in 2004, possibly to 'please' the high-tech business community in California -an indication of more complex conflicts of interest than the ACTIVE/PASSIVE classification may suggest. 25 The dependent variable is therefore NONINSIDER_VOTES= log [NONINSVOTESFOR/(1-NONINSVOTESFOR)], where NONINSVOTESFOR= Votes For /(Votes For + Votes Against -Votes Insiders).
thereby strengthening our confidence in the results. In untabulated tests, we also repeat the analyses in columns 3-6 after re-defining VOTESFOR as a fraction of all votes cast by noninsiders. Again, the coefficient on INSIDEOWN is positive and significant, and the previous inferences about the relation between voting outcome and types of institutional ownership are essentially unaffected.
Results for the control variables are generally consistent across the eight columns. Most of the controls related to "financial characteristics" are significant in the predicted direction: ESO expensing proposals tend to receive greater support in firms with higher leverage, higher interest coverage ratio (though only in some specifications) and worse stock performance, while the coefficient on size, though positive, is not significant. As predicted, the voting outcome is positively correlated with VOTESWITHHELD, suggesting greater support for ESO expensing when alternative monitoring mechanisms (Board of Directors) are believed to be ineffective. The other controls related to "governance" and "industry" characteristics are not significant.
Robustness Tests
To verify the robustness of our results we performed a series of additional tests.
First, we find that in all the OLS regressions above, the independent variables have a Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) score below 3, alleviating concerns of multi-collinearity.
Second, to account for potential selection bias, in Table 4 Panel B, we repeat the analysis using a two-step Heckman procedure and find that the results in Panel A are basically unchanged, except that VOTESWITHHELD, though still positive, becomes often insignificant and that VOLUNTEXP is significantly negative in columns 7 and 8. Noticeably, the coefficient on LAMBDA (the inverse Mill's ratio obtained from the first-step probit regression) is not significant, suggesting that selection bias is not a concern.
Finally, we performed some robustness tests on the main variables. In particular, we redefined OPTEXPENSE based on the three-year average option expense as opposed to the option expense disclosed in the last fiscal year. Also, we re-computed EXCESSOPTCEO i) to account for differences in CEO tenure 26 , and ii) to include options held by all the Named Executive Officers (i.e. top 5 executives) as opposed to the CEO only. The results in Table 4 are largely robust to these alternative definitions, with two exceptions: PASSIVE becomes mostly significant under the alternative definitions of EXCESSOPTCEO, and OPTEXPENSE becomes insignificant in Panel B when we redefine EXCESSOPTCEO to account for differences in CEO tenure.
Conclusions
Over the 2003 and 2004 proxy seasons, a group of union funds and other shareholder activists targeted more than 150 firms with a proposal to expense ESO-the first time, the S.E.C.
allowed shareholder proposals on an accounting matter. In this study we provide evidence on shareholders' views on ESO expensing by examining the voting outcome of these proposals at a sample of 107 firms.
We document that voting support was among the largest for a shareholder proposal (on average, 47% votes for). We find votes in favor of ESO expensing were higher in firms with more perceived excessive CEO option compensation and lower expected earnings impact from expensing, consistent with the notion that shareholders traded-off the potential costs associated with the earnings impact for the benefits of a more moderate use of ESO (expected as a result of expensing). We also find that shareholder ownership mattered. On average, institutional investors voted in favor of ESO expensing, but they did not do so if they had greater potential conflicts of interest with management. Not surprisingly insiders sided with management and voted against ESO expensing, but interestingly, insider ownership was positively related to votes cast in favor of ESO expensing by non-insider shareholders, possibly due to the perception that higher insider ownership exacerbated the problems associated with excessive option compensation. Finally, support for ESO expensing appeared to be related to a number of control variables, suggesting that like in other shareholder proposals, past performance, contracting costs, and governance concerns played a significant role in shareholders' voting decisions.
In addition to providing evidence on shareholder views on ESO expensing-one of the most controversial issues in accounting history-our work contributes to analyzing a novel lobbying mechanism-shareholder votes-that may be used by shareholders to gather and formalize other investors' support, have a voice and influence on the firms' accounting choices, generate media attention, and, perhaps influence regulators opinions. Our findings may be of interest to managers, shareholder activists, proxy voting services, regulators and standard setters, although we suggest caution in drawing any standard setting implication from our study.
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earlier than 5 years ago are unlikely to be still outstanding, since most ESO vest within 3-4 years and tend to be exercised soon after vesting. 27 First, we examine a small sample of firms -although voting shareholders at these firms constitute a large, representative sample of institutional and individual investors. Second, shareholders in these firms are not called to vote on the desirability of ESO expensing for all publicly traded firms, thus issues of competitive disadvantage and comparability may play a role -although shareholders were certainly aware that their votes would be watched closely by the business community. Finally, our sample is biased toward large firms. Thus, while we try to correct for selection bias, our results may not be generalizable to smaller firms. complete a study before FASB is permitted to implement its proposed rule; ii) limit expensing to options granted to the top 5 five executives (using a zero volatility assumption in the option pricing model), iii) entirely exempt small businesses, and iv) allow newly public firms not to expense ESO for 3 years.
Dec 2003
The anti-expensing lobby argues that expensing will damage productivity and employment at U.S. high-tech firms (Business Week, 12/22/2003 All the cost is reflected in diluted EPS, expensing would be misleading. The economic cost of a stock option grant is borne by the stockholders through the potential dilution of their ownership interest.
To create an expense in addition to the cost of dilution currently reflected in financial statements would impair the transparency, comparability and usefulness of the company's financial reports and would inappropriately and imprecisely "double count" the effect of stock options." There is already complete information to assess the impact of stock options on the value of the company. 
The company should await development of rules by FASB/SEC
The Financial Accounting Standards Board is studying the issue of expensing employee stock options and the debate may be settled in the relatively near future. The Board of Directors believes that it would not be appropriate to begin expensing stock options until there is more clarity on the issue. The "Intrinsic Value" Method is the most widely used and investors have a need for financial statements that facilitate comparisons between companies. The firm should follow the most widely used industry practice and should avoid adopting a practice that would place it at a competitive disadvantage. Deter strategies promoting short term stock price rather than long term corporate value Expensing will harm the ability of the company to use option plans, which are a powerful incentive and retention tool that benefits all of our stockholders 
Source: Proxy Statements of Firms Targeted by a Shareholder Proposal for Expensing Stock Options
MAIN EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
EXCESSOPTCEO= Difference in the ratio (Number of Options held by CEO / Total Shares Outstanding) between each firm and its 'industry&size' median, scaled by the 'industry&size' median. The 'industry&size' median is the median value for all other Execucomp firms in the same industry (defined as in Core and Guay 1999) and within the same size quartile. The Number of Options held by the CEO is obtained from Execucomp, while Total Shares Outstanding are from Compustat (DATA 25).
Positive EXCESSOPTNONCEO= As EXCESSOPTCEO, but with the numerator being the Number of Options Outstanding not held by the CEO. The latter is computed subtracting the options held by the CEO from all the options outstanding. Unclear 1 For the sample firms, the total number of options outstanding is hand-collected from the 10K. For the control firms, we divide the number of options held by the CEO by the three-year average of the ratio (# Options Granted to CEO / # Total Options Granted). This proxy assumes that the pattern of option grants and exercises over time is similar for the CEO and all other employees, and that the percentage of total options grants allocated to the CEO is constant over time. We validate our proxy by estimating its correlation with the actual value for our sample of 107 firms. The Pearson correlation is 0.71 (p-value<0.0001). 2 A particular adjustment was required for Hershey Foods Corp. While insiders formally own 12% of the common stock through the Milton Hershey School Trust (MHST), a footnote in the proxy statement reveals that MHST "will be entitled to cast 12,276,671 of the total 102,132,277 votes, or 12%, entitled to be cast on matters required to be voted on separately by the holders of the Common Stock, and 315, 336, 731 of the total 406, 355, 357 votes, or 77 .6%, entitled to be cast by the holders of the Common Stock and the Class B Stock voting together on matters to be voted on without regard to class" -an example being the option expensing proposal. Thus, insiders de facto controlled 77.6% of the votes on the expensing proposal, hence the very low percentage of votes FOR at Hershey Foods (see Table 1 , Panel B). Note that in this case, we also re-scale accordingly the percentage ownership by institutions.
Appendix 3: Definition of Variables (Continuation)
Expected relation to VOTES CONTROL VARIABLES LONGTERM, TRANSIENT = % of shares held, respectively, by 'long-term' ('dedicated' and 'quasi-indexers') and 'transient' institutional investors, defined as in Bushee (1998) 
Positive or no relation
HITECH= Dummy equal to 1 for high tech firms (0 else), defined as in Murphy (2003) (SIC codes: 3570-3572, 3576-3577, 3661, 3674, 4812-4813, 5045, 5961, 7370-7373) . LONGTERM, TRANSIENT = % of shares held by, respectively 'long-term' ('dedicated' plus 'quasi-indexers'), and 'transient' institutional investors, classified as per Bushee (1998) . ACTIVE = Percentage of shares held by institutional investors with lower probability of actual or potential business ties with the firm based on the Thomson Financial classification (investment companies, independent investment advisors, others -endowment funds, foundations, etc.) PASSIVE = Percentage of shares held by institutional investors with higher probability of actual or potential business ties with the firm (banks, insurance companies). SIZE = Total assets of the firm (billion $). ADJRET = Industry-adjusted stock returns over the 3-year period before the shareholders' vote. LEVERAGE = Total debt divided by total assets. INTERESTCOVG = Dummy variable equal to 1 if the interest coverage ratio is above the sample median, 0 else. CONFLICT = Dummy variable equal to 1 if a conflict of interest on the Compensation Committee is disclosed in the Proxy Statement, 0 otherwise. VOTESWITHHELD= Highest percentage of votes withheld from any director up for re-election at the annual meeting where the ESO expensing proposal is voted upon. NONAPPROVEQUITY = Fraction of total options outstanding which was granted under equity compensation plans not submitted to shareholders for approval. VOLUNTEXP = % of firms in the same industry that were expensing options at the time shareholders voted on the option expensing proposal. HITECH= Dummy equal to 1 for firms in high tech industry, 0 otherwise. 
